Israel's Military Admits Misjudging Hamas in Deadliest Attack

An investigation by the Israeli military has revealed that Hamas successfully carried out the deadliest terrorist attack in Israeli history on October 7, 2023, due to a fundamental misjudgment of the militant group's intentions and capabilities by the much more powerful Israeli army. The findings, released Thursday, state that "a large-scale, surprise attack was not considered to be a likely scenario, due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy." The IDF and intelligence agencies perceived Hamas as a limited and reactive threat, assuming that an early warning would precede any large-scale offensive.

These revelations could put pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a broader inquiry into the political decision-making that preceded the attack, which triggered the war in Gaza. Despite public pressure, including from the families of the roughly 1,200 people killed in the October 7 attack and the 251 taken as hostages into Gaza, Netanyahu has resisted calls for a commission of inquiry.

Military's Findings: Misread Intentions and Underestimated Capabilities

The military's main findings indicate that the region's most powerful and sophisticated military misread Hamas' intentions, underestimated its capabilities, and was wholly unprepared for the surprise attack by thousands of heavily armed militants in the early morning hours of a major Jewish holiday. An Israeli army M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer fires rounds near the border with Gaza in southern Israel on October 11, 2023. Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images In comments made to military commanders Monday and shared with the media on Thursday, the army's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, said he took responsibility for the army's failures. "I was the commander of the military on October 7th, and I have my own responsibility. I also carry the weight of all your responsibility — that, too, I see as mine," said Halevi, who announced his resignation in January and is set to step down next week.

The military's findings are in line with past conclusions reached by officials and analysts. The military released only a summary of the report and military officials outlined its findings. "Oct. 7 was a complete failure," said one official, speaking on condition of anonymity. Another official, also speaking anonymously, added that "there were systemic failures, not just individual mistakes."

Hamas' Strategic Planning

According to the report, intelligence shows that Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the October 7 attack who was killed last October, had started planning it as early as 2017. With the military off guard on a holiday weekend, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that allowed thousands of fighters to burst through the security fence or fly over it on hang gliders. They knocked out surveillance cameras and quickly overwhelmed hundreds of soldiers stationed along the border. From there they advanced to key highway intersections and attacked troops dispatched to the area, including some senior officers, disrupting the military's command and control.

The Initial Chaos and Aftermath

For the first three hours after the attack, Hamas fighters marauded through border communities and a music festival with little resistance. That was when most of the 251 hostages were taken and most people were killed. The official said the chaos led to friendly fire incidents, although he said there were not many, without disclosing a figure. It took hours for the military to regain control and days until the area was fully cleared of militants.

Recommendations for Reform

The report blamed the military for being overconfident in its knowledge and not showing enough doubt in its core concepts and beliefs. The summary said a key lesson was that Israel could not let a threat develop on its border. It spelled out several recommendations, including creating special units meant to prepare for such surprise and large-scale events, as well as reform in the military intelligence department that would foster "openness, skepticism, listening, learning."

The report did not place blame on any individual soldiers or officers but is likely to pave the way for a reckoning in the military and eventual dismissals. Some high-ranking officers other than Halevi have also resigned, including the former head of military intelligence.